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Understanding emotion is essential to developing an account of why people commit 
crime and how they react when caught. Research across a number of disciplines 
suggests that shame, which is the focus of this chapter, plays a significant role in how 
societies gain conformity (Barbalet, 1998; Benedict, 1946; Braithwaite, 1989; Scheff, 
1988). The emotion has been described as significant in explaining whether individuals 
are likely to commit criminal offences (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Svensson, 2004; 
Tittle, Bratton & Gertz, 2003; Wikström, 2004), as well as how individuals respond to 
criminal justice interventions having been caught (Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite & 
Braithwaite, 2001; Braithwaite, 1989; Retzinger & Scheff, 1996). While this breadth of 
inquiry suggests that shame is an important topic for criminologists, this chapter will 
draw on social psychological research to argue that current theoretical conceptions do 
not provide an adequate explanation of the role that shame plays in conformity or 
deviance.  An alternative explanation based on the premise that shame reflects threat to 
an individual’s ethical-identity will be forwarded.  
 The first task in addressing this question is to explore the way in which shame 
has already been cast as an emotion that is central to explaining social conformity. 
Despite being described by many as an inherently social emotion it will be argued that 
limited attention has been given to understanding the social factors that lead to feelings 
of shame. We will then turn to some findings from research on social influence. These 
suggest that shame is unlikely to be an emotion that only reflects fear of disapproval by 
others. It is argued that the emotion should instead be conceptualised as a response to 
the perception of having violated an ethical norm, and that this involves threat to the 
individual's ethical identity. This conception of shame, which was developed as a 
consequence of an earlier research project (Harris, 2001), is then used to explain the 
way in which individuals respond to criminal justice interventions. Research that 
suggests individuals manage shame-related emotions in different ways is reviewed and 
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it is argued that the reactions of others are critical in explaining how an individual 
responds to the threat shame poses to their identity. Finally, some possible implications 
for why individuals engage in crime are explored. It is proposed that commitments to 
moral norms, and conformity to social expectations, are dependent upon having an 
integrated ethical identity. 
 
Shame and conformity 
Emotions such a shame, guilt and embarrassment occur when an individual perceives 
that they have violated a norm, as judged by their self or by others. So a central 
characteristic of these shame-related emotions is that they are concerned with 
judgements about what is wrong or undesirable. It is this perception that results in an 
emotional response that might include feelings of awkwardness, rejection by others, 
personal failure, a sense of having done wrong, etc. At the micro level these emotions 
occur as a result of how individuals define their own values (Braithwaite, 1982) or 
norms in relation to the values or expectations of those around them. However, these 
expectations also reflect broader social norms, and so these emotions are also important 
for understanding how social groups or societies seek to maintain conformity with 
particular values.  
 This is not a new or revolutionary claim as there are strong theoretical traditions 
that have conceived of the shame-related emotions in this way. This is particularly 
evident in the work of Anthropologists like Mead (1937) and Benedict (1946) who 
sought to distinguish between forms of social control by examining the differences 
between shame cultures and guilt cultures. Shame in this context is the emotion most 
obviously related to conformity because shame cultures are described as those that rely 
primarily on social disapproval to maintain conformity. Guilt cultures are described as 
  5
those that rely on individuals internalising social values and regulating their own 
behaviour.  
 This distinction between shame and guilt provides the basis for one of the 
dominant conceptions of shame, the social threat conception, which conceives of the 
emotion as a response to the fear of rejection.  An implication of Benedict and Mead's 
analysis is that shame results from fear of disapproval or rejection by others. This idea 
is elaborated on by a number of scholars who have argued that shame is a response to 
the perception that one's social bonds with others are threatened (Leary, 2000; Scheff & 
Retzinger, 1991), the perception of having transgressed other's values (Gibbons, 1990), 
or the perception of having lower social status (Gilbert, 1997). It will be argued in the 
next section that the cause of shame is more complex than this implies because shame is 
related to the normative judgements that individuals make rather that simply the 
acceptance of others’ judgements. To adequately account for shame we need to examine 
the process by which individuals come to believe that something is wrong or 
undesirable. 
 The other dominant conception of shame, the personal failure conception, 
explains the emotion as a primarily intra-psychic response to negative self-evaluation. 
This idea stems from psychoanalytic perspectives (Piers & Singer, 1953; H. Lewis, 
1971; Wurmser, 1981), which argue that shame is a consequence of tension that arises 
from a discrepancy between the individual's perceived self (ego) and their perception of 
who they would like to be (ego-ideal). The individual perceives their self as a failure 
because they haven’t lived up to their own standards. An alternative explanation based 
on attribution theory, but with a similar emphasis, is that shame results from the 
individual's attribution that the whole self is a failure (M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1991). 
These perspectives emphasise the significance of the individual's interpretation of 
events and provide little explanation as to the social circumstances in which this occurs. 
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Implications from research on influence 
Shame as a product of social influence 
The only explanation of conformity that can be taken from these conceptions of shame, 
given that one of them says little about the social context in which the emotion occurs, 
is that individuals conform so as to avoid being disapproved of or looked down upon by 
others. Conformity to social expectations, from this perspective, occurs because the 
consequence of non-conformity is an unpleasant emotion that we feel as a direct result 
of perceived disapproval by others. This depiction of shame is remarkably consistent 
with what social psychology has termed normative influence, which is understood as 
having occurred when the individual alters their attitude or behaviour in a public context 
so as to avoid appearing different from the majority (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Cialdini 
& Trost, 1998). While change in public attitudes or behaviour allows the individual to 
comply with group norms, it does not represent a change in the individual's private 
attitudes, and is performed simply to avoid social disapproval. Of course, like the 
description of shame in shame cultures, the concept of normative influence is primarily 
concerned with why individuals act to avoid social censure rather than the consequences 
of social censure itself. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the social threat 
conception of shame and theories of normative influence share the same underlying 
explanation of conformity (Scheff, 1988). 
 However, research into social influence suggests that this understanding of 
shame is simplistic for the simple reason that the opinions of others often effect our 
beliefs about the world (Festinger, 1950). While initial research suggested that this is 
particularly significant in contexts where the truth is ambiguous (Sherif, 1936) research 
has since shown that the importance of social validation is more pervasive. This is 
particularly evident in research based on Asch's (1956) influential conformity studies. 
These studies show that individuals are influenced to make incorrect judgements about 
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fairly easy perceptual tasks when the task is performed among a group who 
unanimously give an incorrect answer. While, on its own this effect looks like evidence 
of normative influence (Scheff, 1988), subsequent research has shown that some 
influence still occurs, though less, when people are allowed to make their judgement in 
private (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), and that the amount of influence is dependent upon 
other factors such as consistency amongst the group (Asch, 1956), external verification 
of the group's response (Crutchfield, 1955), and the identity of the other participants 
(Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990). These additional findings 
suggest that a reasonable proportion of the conformity that occurs is explained by 
perceptions that the group is actually right. This shows that even on a fairly simple task 
individuals accept others' judgements as a valid source of information and as a result are 
influenced (Hogg & Turner, 1987). 
 Moscovici (1976) has argued that uncertainty about one's beliefs, and 
subsequently influence, occurs when we disagree with people who we would expect to 
agree with. Social validation is seen as underlying a broad range of beliefs that we hold, 
and individuals are much more dependent upon others for confirmation about their 
perceptions about the world than is often recognised. 
 
It is true, of course, that technical instruments permit an individual to make 
decisions about the environment by himself; but even these instruments 
conceal a consensus, since the mode of action of a tool or the 
appropriateness of a measuring device must be agreed upon by all if the 
result of such operations is to carry any information. 
(Moscovici, 1976; p. 70) 
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Hogg and Turner (1987; Turner, 1991) have built upon the concept of informational 
influence in forwarding a theory of referent informational influence. This theory argues 
that others' opinions are accepted as providing accurate information about reality, but 
only when those people are seen as having the same social identity (Tajfel 1972; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). Having the same social identity is critical because the perception that 
the other person as similar to oneself on relevant dimensions is necessary to accept that 
they are a valid reference point for one's own beliefs. This claim is supported by a 
number of studies which show that when others are perceived as having the same 
identity they exert greater influence (Abrams, et al., 1990). 
 Psychological research which shows that individuals are responsive to others’ 
interpretations of what is right, is consistent with Williams's (1993) philosophical 
characterisation of shame and moral decision making. He criticises the Kantian notion 
that individuals are morally autonomous and argues that without social support for a 
particular view it is hard to tell whether an individual is '...a solitary bearer of true 
justice or a deluded crank' (Williams, 1993;99). Shame, according to Williams, should 
be understood as a response to the perception that what one has done violates values 
that are important to one's identity, but this is based upon a shared conception of 
morality. As research in social influence suggests, disapproval is likely to result in 
feeling shame not just because disapproval communicates what is negatively judged but 
because it expresses a judgement which the individual perceives as legitimate: the 
individual accepts the interpretation that what they have done is shameful. Significantly, 
this also suggests that shame is an emotion that is centrally concerned with the question 
of what individuals think is right or wrong. Others' opinions are important because, as 
research on neutralisation theory (Maruna & Copes, 2005; Sykes & Matza, 1957) 
shows, decisions about the morality of behaviour and possible justifications for actions 
often occur in contexts that are perceived as ambiguous. Shame, then, might be 
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understood as the painful recognition that one’s behaviour is inconsistent with social 
values that oneself, and other people like one’s self, ascribe to. 
 Some evidence that shame is dependent upon acceptance of other’s opinions, 
rather than fear of rejection, was found in interviews with drink driving offenders in the 
Reintegrative Shaming Experiments (Harris, 2001). An important predictor of feeling 
shame-guilt in these cases was that other people disapproved, but only when the people 
present at the case were both very disapproving and highly respected by the offender. 
This finding suggests that disapproval is only significant when it comes from people 
who the individual respects. Analyses also showed that shame-guilt was negatively 
related to stigmatisation (but positively related to reintegration). This also seems 
contrary to the hypothesis that shame is a response to normative pressure, because it 
suggests that social rejection results in less shame. 
 
Shame, beliefs and identity. 
Research on influence may also help explain the observation by numerous scholars that 
shame is intimately tied to notions of identity (H. Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; 
Lynd, 1958; Sabini & Silver, 1997; Williams, 1993, Wurmser, 1981). Indeed, a defining 
characteristic of the emotion according to a number of conceptions is that shame is the 
emotion that is evoked when the individual feels that their 'whole self' is deficient in 
some way (H. Lewis, 1971; M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney, 1991). As discussed above, 
social identity theory argues that the individual's identity is central to understanding 
how they react to disapproval from others. Genuine influence will only occur, according 
to the theory, where individuals perceive others as sharing a relevant identity (Hogg & 
Turner, 1987). This is because someone who is similar to oneself is seen as having 
opinions that are valid to oneself. Identity in this framework is logically tied to 
normative beliefs: individuals have particular normative values because they are 
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consistent with their identity. Identity is seen as providing the individual with a 
framework with which to understand the world as well as their place in it.  
 What is interesting about this understanding of influence is the implication that 
an individual’s identity is also dependent upon them having values that are consistent 
with their identity. Someone is unlikely to hold a particular identity if they are aware 
that they have inconsistent beliefs. So the relationship between values and identity is 
reciprocal, and having certain values is essential to having a particular identity. 
 
If shared social identity is the basis of mutual influence between people 
(Turner, 1991), it is also a central object of influence: the construction and 
validation of people’s definition of who they are (and are not) are basic to 
the task of developing shared norms, values and goals... (Turner & Onorato, 
1999: p. 27) 
 
 If an individual’s identity is dependent upon their having particular values then 
the violation of these values also has important implications for their sense of who they 
are. In effect, the individual is presented with evidence that is inconsistent with who 
they thought they were. Thus, shame would seem to involve a threat to identity that 
involves an inconsistency between beliefs about who one is and evidence to the contrary 
(Harris, 2001). 
 While this suggests that shame is a response to the violation of internalised 
beliefs and has consequences for an individual’s sense of identity, there are some 
important differences between this ethical-identity conception of shame and the 
proposition that shame is principally defined by negative self-evaluation (M. Lewis, 
1992; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, Gramzow, 1992). The later implies 
that shame is an almost dysfunctional response, which is damaging to the individual and 
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impedes their ability to respond appropriately to the situation. In characterising the 
emotion in this way, Tangney & Dearing (2001) describes it as “...an extremely painful 
and ugly feeling that has a negative impact on interpersonal behaviour” (p. 3).  
The ethical-identity conception suggests that shame has a more complex 
relationship with sense of identity than simply diminished esteem. The proposition that 
a defining characteristic of shame is a threat to identity highlights the individual’s 
capacity to respond in various ways to the inconsistency between behaviour and 
identity. While an individual may resolve feelings of shame by seeing their self as 
defective (accepting the group's norms but internalising one’s low status), they might 
alternatively respond by emphasising a different identity (perceiving themselves as 
having an alternative identity, which is consistent with their behaviour) or by 
diminishing the significance of their behaviour in some way (neutralising the behaviour 
to avoid acknowledging that it is shameful or repairing and apologising which allows 
the behaviour to be integrated into a positive identity). It is hypothesised that which of 
these responses occurs will depend upon the degree to which the individual accepts that 
what they have done is wrong. In turn, this will be influenced by their social 
relationships with others and the type of social validation they receive. 
 To summarise, if the research on social influence discussed is applied to shame 
then it has a number of implications for how we understand the emotion. The first of 
these is that a precondition for feeling shame is the perception of having violated a 
social norm, and that this perception is often based upon social validation. The 
relationship between values and identity suggests that violation of an important norm 
will undermine the individual's identity because it provides evidence that they don’t 
subscribe to values that define that identity.  
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Implications for understanding the role of shame in criminal justice 
This analysis of shame has a number of implications for understanding the significance 
of the emotions in criminological contexts. One of these is that criminal justice 
interventions represent a context in which shame is very likely to be felt, even if it is 
sometimes hidden, as is suggested by Scheff & Retzinger (1991). Censure through a 
court appearance for many people will represent a failure to live up to an accepted value 
(e.g. not breaking the law) that is important enough for its transgression to represent 
some kind of threat to their moral identity (e.g. as a good member of society). This will 
be even more so in cases where the offence is perceived as serious, where the institution 
is perceived as having greater legitimacy and where the individual’s actions are 
disapproved of by significant others. Thus, it is important to acknowledge that shame is 
present or at least threatening in many criminal justice interventions (Harris, Walgrave 
& Braithwaite, 1994).  
 A second implication is that the way in which individuals manage feelings of 
shame may determine the effect that criminal justice interventions have on them 
(Ahmed, et al., 2001). There is growing evidence that individuals manage or respond to 
shame in a variety of ways. Lewis (1971) and Scheff (1990; & Retzinger, 1991) and 
Retzinger (1991) have distinguished between acknowledged and unacknowledged 
forms of shame. While acknowledged shame involves the overt acceptance of the 
emotion, unacknowledged shame involves either the mislabelling of the emotion (overt 
undifferentiated shame) or an attempt to suppress the emotion entirely (bypassed 
shame). They argue that acknowledgement of shame is important because failure to do 
so is associated with ongoing psychological problems including feelings of anger and 
hostility towards others. This is consistent with research which shows that individuals 
who experienced a response similar to unacknowledged shame (unresolved shame) 
were more likely to feel hostility towards others, following a criminal justice 
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intervention, than other participants (Harris, 2003). In contrast, overt feelings of shame-
guilt were associated with empathy for victims and lower feelings of hostility. Important 
differences between types of shame have also been found by Ahmed and her colleagues 
(Ahmed, 2001; Ahmed & Braithwaite, this volume; Ahmed & Braithwaite, in press) in 
samples of school children and adult workers in Australia and Bangladesh. The types of 
shame reported by participants in these studies were significant predictors of whether 
children or adults had bullied others or had been the victims of bullying. This and other 
research (Nathanson, 1997, Retzinger, 1991; Tangney, 1991) seems to confirm that 
differences in the emotional response people have to shameful situations is important in 
understanding their behaviour.  
 Understanding the emotion of shame is particularly relevant to reintegrative 
shaming theory (Braithwaite 1989; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001), which predicts 
that reintegrative shaming will reduce offending but that stigmatising shaming will 
increase offending. The relationship between identity and influence that is proposed 
above suggests that the important difference between stigmatisation and reintegration is 
their effect on the way in which individuals manage shame. Acknowledgement of 
shame depends upon the individual’s acceptance of an interpretation of their behaviour 
as shameful. Stigmatisation acts in two ways to make this less likely. It firstly 
diminished the ability of those who are disapproving to provide social validation, 
because an obvious function of stigmatisation is to differentiate between the identities 
of the shamers and the shamed. Secondly, stigmatisation also makes reacceptance into 
that group, and hence acknowledgement of shame, less attractive to the individual. 
Stigmatisation might be particularly destructive in cases where it undermines important 
identities, because the individual is left with the choice of maintaining the same social 
identities but with lower status or attempting to define a new identity. Reintegration, on 
the other hand, maintains the disapprover's status as a source of social validation by 
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emphasising similarity in identity and maintains that social identity as attractive for the 
individual.  
 
Implications for understanding why people commit crime 
The relationship between shame and identity that is proposed here may also have 
implications for understanding why it is that people do or don’t commit crime. The 
significance of shame for explaining the propensity to engage in crime has already been 
explored within a number of theoretical frameworks. One of these, which is implicit in 
the anthropological approaches discussed earlier, is as a deterrent. This perspective has 
been explored by a number of studies that have compared the deterrent qualities of the 
shame-related emotions, as perceived by participants, with perceptions of official 
sanctions (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Paternoster & Iovanni, 1986; Tibbetts, 1997). In 
general, these studies have shown that expectations of feeling shame are associated with 
lower self-reported projections of offending, and in some cases that the effect is 
comparable with, or greater than, official sanctions. 
 While these studies suggest that shame may be a significant deterrent, it has 
been argued in this chapter that of greater significance is the emotion's relationship to 
ethical values. This is also the basis of the alternative premise that the propensity to feel 
shame is related to lower offending because it is a reflection of the individual's moral 
values (Braithwaite, 1989; Svensson, 2004; Wikström, 2004). Reintegrative shaming 
theory (Braithwaite 1989; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001) suggests that the primary 
reason why individuals do not commit crime is because these behaviours are 
internalised, in the form of conscience. From this perspective individuals do not commit 
crime just because they are deterred by negative consequences but because they 
perceive the behaviour as the wrong thing to do. Braithwaite argues that one advantage 
of reintegrative shaming is that it appeals to the individual’s moral sensibilities and in 
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doing so reinforces their commitment to those values. Wikström (2004), who places a 
similar emphasis on shame's moral qualities, argues that the emotion is a protective 
factor in preventing offending. Shame in this framework represents a response to the 
individual's commitment to do the right thing, which in turn influences their perception 
of the choices available in a given context. Studies by both Wikström (2002) and 
Svensson (2004) show that juveniles who report that they would feel shame in front of 
others (e.g. friends) if they committed a crime also reported lower levels of 
delinquency.  
 The emphasis that is placed by these theories on the significance of having a 
commitment to pro-social norms reflects the importance placed on commitment to the 
law by criminological theory, particularly control theory, and empirical findings that it 
is a significant factor in predicting delinquency (e.g. Grasmick & Green, 1980; Hirschi, 
1969; Siegel, Rathus, & Ruppert, 1973). Shame is seen as a significant emotion because 
it reflects the individual’s commitment to norms. However, the relationship between 
identity and moral values, that was discussed earlier, suggests that the individual's sense 
of self may play an important mediating role in this relationship.  
 A key prediction of social identity theory (Tajfel, 1972) is that individuals have 
many social identities and that different identities will be salient depending upon the 
social context. Furthermore, each identity will emphasise different personal 
characteristics. So the identity of daughter implies very different characteristics to the 
identity of heavy metal rocker, yet both might belong to the same person. This is 
significant because if identities and values are interdependent then it also predicts that 
an individual’s commitment to pro-social values will vary across identities. For 
example, the value of being a careful driver (especially in relation to drink driving) that 
someone might hold as a good family man, may not be as relevant on a Thursday night 
after football training, when being a member of the team is more salient. This suggests 
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that the interaction between an individual's identities is important in determining their 
commitment to particular values. 
 An important tension exists between this idea that individuals have multiple 
identities and research on the self, which suggests that having a consistent or integrated 
self is psychologically healthy (Baumeister, 1998; Swann, 1987). The social identity 
perspective takes this into account by arguing that the identities an individual will adopt 
are limited by the individual’s previous beliefs about who they are (Turner, et al., 1987). 
This is supported by a study (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996), which suggests that 
individuals engage in a process of negotiating shared identities based upon the 
underlying values inherent in that identity. It would seem that individuals play an active 
role in determining how they see themselves, and that they tend to adopt identities that 
are consistent in the underlying values they espouse. Prior commitments to particular 
identities means that others cannot be taken on as easily, and so it would follow that 
most people have commitments across identities to the same ethical values. 
 The implication of this research is that weak commitment to social norms may 
be the result of a weakly integrated self, which is characterised by inconsistent 
identities. This proposition is supported by the research on social validation that was 
discussed earlier, which shows how influential the opinions of others are in forming our 
own beliefs. If sharing an identity provides a means of validating the opinions of others, 
as Hogg and Turner (1987) argue, then it is unsurprising that individuals without 
coherent social identities are less sure of the moral decisions that they make, or whose 
judgements they should believe. One context in which having multiple, and sometimes 
conflicting, identities may explain a low commitment to social norms is adolescence. It 
is conceivable that the age at which one’s social identities are least integrated is during 
adolescence when the individual starts to form new social relationships that potentially 
have different value structures. This is exactly what was found by Emler and Reicher 
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(1995). In their research on 12 to 16 year olds in the United Kingdom they found that 
young people often held representations of their selves that were mutually incompatible. 
They concluded that this was possible because the peers and families of these young 
people had very limited contact with each other, and that that this was even more 
pronounced for those youth who reported the greatest levels of delinquency. It might be 
speculated that a characteristic of many delinquents is that they struggle to manage 
identities that are defined by different values. 
 This framework for understanding commitment to ethical norms, and moral 
decision making, suggests that a central issue for at least some offenders may be 
developing a coherent and stable sense of self. This conclusion is similar to the one 
reached by Maruna (2001), that what distinguished the long term criminals who had 
reformed in his sample, from those who persisted in crime, is the narrative the 
individual has about their own identity. Those who reformed, developed narratives in 
which offending was not part of their 'real self'. The self that was associated in the past 
with crime had been the product of bad luck or bad circumstances, but was now less 
relevant to their ongoing sense of self. In contrast, their 'real self' was presented as 
having the ambition and capability to 'make good'. These findings might be interpreted 
as showing that the ability to act according to one's social values, and perhaps 
acknowledge feeling shame for violating them, is a result of having a coherent sense of 
self. 
 
Shame and integrity 
Conceptualising the value of having an integrated self might be helped by the notion of 
integrity that can be found in moral philosophy. A number of philosophers such as 
Frankfurt (1971), Taylor (1985), Williams (1973), and Calhoun (1995) have espoused 
the virtue of having integrity. It is argued that to have integrity the person must make 
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decisions about what they want or value, rather than simply acting on every desire, as 
well as being able to behave in accordance with these higher order goals. Threats to 
integrity include self-deception about one's desires, weakness of will to act in 
accordance with one's values, and conflict between competing values (Frankfurt, 1971). 
An important characteristic of integrity is the notion of wholeness: that the individual's 
values cohere and that this is reflected in their actions. A second important 
characteristic, which follows from this, is that individuals must identify with these 
values. This is important because having integrity means that one's actions are 
determined by who the person is and what they believe in (Williams, 1973). 
 This sense of integrity does not mean behaving in accordance with a 
predetermined set of moral values. It is better understood as having a coherent set of 
values that the individual feels able to live up to. Shame, as it is described in this 
chapter, is central to this because it represents a threat to having this coherent set of 
values (an ethical-identity). The emotion occurs when one's ethical-identity is 
threatened by a particular act. However, it might also be suggested that for individuals 
who have low integrity (weak ethical-identities) the threat of shame is always present. 
Disparate social identities mean that that the individual must fight a continual battle to 
live up to contradictory normative expectations, and often fail. This suggests that 
integrity is not just a virtue for ethical reasons, but that psychological integrity is a 
virtue because it underlies the individual's ability to develop coherent values that they 
feel able to live up to. These skills are necessary for developing social relationships, for 
having a sense of self-respect (Taylor, 1985), and behaving in ways that are accepted by 
one's community.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has developed, on the basis of research on social influence, an account of the 
social context in which shame occurs. Rather than being a simple response to the fear of 
rejection it is argued that shame occurs as a result of the individual’s perception that 
what they have done is wrong. An important characteristic of the emotion is that it 
emerges in a context in which individuals often perceive that there is ambiguity about 
what is right. The connections between an individual’s beliefs, identity and social 
relationships suggest that the emotion and its resolution have important implications for 
how the individual sees their self and their relationships with others.  
 It has been argued that understanding the significance of social context and 
identity, and their relationship to shame, is important for criminology because it may 
have significant implications for understanding why it is that some individuals engage 
in crime and why they stop. Findings that offenders have a weaker commitment to 
particular values, and that they are less likely to acknowledge feeling shame for 
committing offences, may reflect a weakly integrated identities. If this is so, then its 
significance is that the interaction between the individual and the social context will be 
of central importance (Wikström, 2004). Individuals with lower integrity between their 
possible identities may have weaker commitment to particular values in some social 
contexts, than they might in others, because of how they understand their self and others 
in that context. Measuring an individual’s commitment to pro-social values in a way 
that does not consider context may be a fairly blunt way of understanding the 
relationship between values and offending. It also ignores the possibility that the 
individual may not hold strong commitments to any values, rather than just pro-social 
ones, which would have a different implications for understanding offending.  
 If ethical-identity is important then this also suggests that attempts to reform or 
rehabilitate need to include opportunities for offender to build a more integrated sense 
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of self. Whether such opportunities can be provided through counselling, or even within 
prison contexts, remains to be seen. Research suggests that of primary significance is 
the way in which relationships to others, and particularly significant others, are 
understood, which suggests that change often occurs through what are perceived as 
profound social interactions (Maruna, 2001). One context in which such interactions 
might begin are family group conferences, where the offender is asked to account for, or 
make sense of, their behaviour in a social context that often includes actors from various 
quarters of their life: partners, children, extended family, work colleagues, friends, and 
victims. Developing a coherent narrative in such a context and receiving social 
validation from a range of significant others may be the kind of event that is capable of 
instigating change. 
 Significantly, these changes in identity and in relationships seem to be 
inextricably linked to emotion. Acknowledgement of shame occurs with the offender’s 
willingness to accept the negative judgement of others. Expression of, and resolution of, 
the emotion would seem to be necessary for the individual to repair social bonds with 
others and to put past behaviour behind them. Negative emotions of unacknowledged 
shame and anger are just as important indicators that the individual remains alienated 
(Ahmed, 2001; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991). Furthermore, if a number pf psychologists 
(e.g. Tomkins, 1962; Brehm, 1999) are right, it is emotions that provide individuals 
with the motivation that is necessary to translate their beliefs into behaviour, and thus 
they need to be central to the concerns of criminologists. 
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